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During the fall of 2014, First Amendment Law Review pub-
lished Demonstrators' Right to Fair Warning, which identified a right
that multiple circuits had attributed to demonstrators, discussed
three possible constitutional foundations for that right, and ultimate-
ly argued that courts should regard it as a narrowed form of First
Amendment review.' As the article went to press, the United States
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit issued an opinion, Garcia v.
Does,2 which was broadly consistent with the article's ultimate ar-
gument.3 On February 23, 2015, however, the Second Circuit re-
versed course, withdrawing its prior opinion and issuing a new one
that reached the opposite conclusion.4
The final opinion in Garcia creates a split among the circuits.
Whereas the Seventh and Tenth Circuits agree that demonstrators'
right to fair warning is "clearly established"-indeed, so evident that
"a defense of immunity would fail even in the absence of a precedent
B.A. 2006, Amherst College; J.D. 2011, Columbia Law School; currently, Assis-
tant United States Attorney, Southern District of New York The ideas set forth
in this Article are mine alone and do not necessarily reflect the views of the De-
partment of Justice, or any component hereof.
1 Caleb Hayes-Deats, Demonstrators' Right to Fair Warning, 13 FIRST AMEND. L.
REV. 140 (2014). For the sake of brevity, familiarity with Demonstrators' Right to
Fair Warning is presumed.
2 764 F.3d 170 (2d Cir. 2014), withdrawn 779 F.3d 84 (2d Cir. 2015).
3 Id.; see also Hayes-Deats, upra note 1, at 163-64 n.128.
4 Garcia v. Does, 779 F.3d 84 (2d Cir. 2015).
that had established the illegality of the defendants' conduct"5-the
Second Circuit has now reached the opposite conclusion. In the
words of the Second Circuit, the decisions reached by the Seventh
and Tenth Circuits "agree[d] on neither the constitutional right at
stake nor its contours" and extended the primary precedent on
which they relied "beyond its due process holding."6 These circuits'
profoundly different conclusions emerge from the general uncertain-
ty over the proper constitutional basis for demonstrators' right to
fair warning.7 As described below, whereas the Second Circuit re-
garded the right to fair warning as a due process right that extended
only to cases of explicit permission,8 the Seventh Circuit's approach
envisioned a greater role for the First Amendment in the analysis.9
The discrepancy between the Second, Seventh, and Tenth
Circuits highlights the analytical ambiguities that motivated Demon-
strators' Right to Fair Warning. Accordingly, this short follow-up
piece examines the newfound circuit split that has developed and
updates the earlier analysis. The Article proceeds in four parts. Part
II discusses Garcia, its holding, and its disagreements with earlier
decisions. Part III analyzes one respect in which Garcia corroborates
the analysis in Demonstrators' Right to Fair Warning. Specifically, it
outlines how Garcia supports two of the earlier article's conclusions:
(1) that the different potential constitutional foundations for demon-
strators' right to fair warning would each create a right of different
scope; and (2) that a right to fair warning grounded in the Due Pro-
cess Clause would not protect demonstrators who had received only
implicit permission for their conduct.'0 Finally, Part IV examines the
primary challenge Garcia poses to the analysis in Demonstrators'
Right to Fair Warning, namely, its conclusion that demonstrators'
s Vodak v. City of Chicago, 639 F.3d 738, 747 (7th Cir. 2011); see also Buck v.
City of Albuquerque, 549 F.3d 1269, 1286-87 (10th Cir. 2008).
6 Garcia, 779 F.3d at 95 n.12.
7 See generally Hayes-Deats, supra note 1, at 175-202 (discussing why the Due
Process Clause, the Fourth Amendment, and the First Amendment might and
might not provide the constitutional foundation for demonstrators' right to fair
warning).
8 Garcia, 779 F.3d at 95.
9 Vodak, 639 F.3d at 749-50; see also Hayes-Deats, supra note 1, at 188-91.
10 Hayes-Deats, supra note 1, at 144-45, 209-12.
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right to fair warning is grounded in the Due Process Clause, rather
than the First Amendment.
11. GARCIA v. DOES
On October 1, 2011, thousands of Occupy Wall Street protes-
tors gathered for a march from Zuccotti Park, in Manhattan, to
Brooklyn Bridge Park, in Brooklyn-a route that would take them
across the Brooklyn Bridge." During the early portions of the march,
police officers directed the demonstrators' movements, at times even
instructing the demonstrators to "proceed in ways ordinarily prohib-
ited under traffic regulations."12 When the demonstrators reached
the Manhattan entrance to the Brooklyn Bridge, a bottleneck formed
because the portion of the bridge reserved for pedestrians was sig-
nificantly narrower than the streets on which demonstrators had
proceeded. Initially, police officers formed a line across the bridge's
vehicular entrance, preventing demonstrators from marching onto
the portion of the bridge reserved for cars.'3 As the demonstrators
continued to arrive at the bottleneck, one police officer stepped for-
ward and used a bullhorn to warn demonstrators that those on the
vehicular roadway were "obstructing traffic" and "subject to ar-
rest."14 All but a few demonstrators could not hear this warning.'5
Subsequently, "the officers ... turned around and began walking un-
hurriedly onto the [Brooklyn] Bridge roadway with their backs to
the protestors."'6 A class of demonstrators alleged that they under-
stood this action by the officers to constitute an "actual and apparent
grant of permission to follow," particularly given that officers had in-
structed demonstrators to proceed in ways that violated traffic regu-
lations at earlier points during the march.'7 Thus, the plaintiffs con-
" Garcia, 779 F.3d at 88.
12 Id.
"3 Id.
14 Id. at 89.
15 Id.; see also Vodak v. City of Chicago, 639 F.3d 738, 746 (7th Cir. 2011) (find-
ing that a bullhorn was "no mechanism ... for conveying a command to thou-
sands of people").
16 Garcia, 779 F.3d at 89.
17 Id.
184
tended that officers had not provided the requisite fair warning
when, half-way across the bridge, the officers stopped, blocked the
movements of over 700 demonstrators who had followed them, and
arrested them for obstructing traffic.18
The Second Circuit disagreed. Rather than addressing the
demonstrators' argument that officers had violated their right to fair
warning, the Second Circuit concluded that any such right was not so
clearly established as to overcome officers' defense of qualified im-
munity.19 According to the Second Circuit, Cox v. Louisiana,20 the
primary Supreme Court case on point, established only that "demon-
strators or others who have been advised by the police that their be-
havior is lawful may not be punished for that behavior."21 Cox had
involved an "explicit consultation between the leaders of the demon-
stration and the police about what conduct would be permitted," and
thus did not address what constitutional protections would apply
where demonstrators had inferred implicit permission from officers'
actions.22 Because the class of demonstrators did not allege that they
had "heard any statement from any police officer authorizing the
protestors to cross the Bridge via the vehicular roadway,"23 the Se-
cond Circuit could conclude only that "the officers were confronted
with ambiguities of fact and law." 2 4 Such ambiguity could not invali-
date the arrests, for which the officers otherwise had probable cause,
because an affirmative defense could defeat probable cause only
where an officer "deliberately disregard[s] facts known to him which
establish justification."25
The Second Circuit carefully limited the scope of its holding,
explaining that it had no occasion to consider whether the demon-
18 Id.
19 Id. at 93.
20 379 U.S. 536 (1965).
21 Garcia, 779 F.3d at 96 (emphasis added).
22Id. at 95.
23 Id.; see also id. at 94 ("The Complaint ... [is] devoid of any evidence that any
police officer made any gesture or spoke any word that unambiguously author-
ized the protesters to continue to block traffic, and indeed the Complaint does
not allege that any of the plaintiffs observed any such gesture.").
24 Id. at 96.
25 Id. at 93 (emphasis added) (quoting Jocks v. Tavernier, 316 F.3d 128, 136 (2d
Cir. 2003)).
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strators had a right to fair warning that would have, as it had in Cox,
provided a defense against conviction for obstructing traffic. 2 6 Thus,
it ostensibly left open the question of whether demonstrators had a
right to fair warning in cases of implicit permission. But in holding
that demonstrators' right to fair warning was not clearly established
in cases of implicit permission-and, more broadly, that the right
factored into the analysis only as an affirmative defense against con-
viction, rather than a prohibition on arrest-the Second Circuit de-
parted markedly from the approaches of the Seventh and Tenth Cir-
cuits, each of which concluded that the right 'to fair warning was
clearly established in cases of implicit permission.27 In fact, the Se-
cond Circuit acknowledged its disagreement with the Seventh and
Tenth Circuits, stating that it believed those courts' opinions had "ex-
tend[ed] Cox beyond its due process holding" and "agree[d] on nei-
ther the constitutional right at stake nor its contours."28
While the disagreement between the Second and Seventh
Circuits primarily concerns whether demonstrators' right to fair
warning is clearly established, such that it overcomes officers' de-
fense of qualified immunity, that disagreement appears to result
from a more fundamental divergence over the nature of the right.29
In contrast to the Second Circuit, the Seventh Circuit noted that the
First Amendment had required officers to grant demonstrators ex-
ceptions from otherwise applicable traffic laws.30 This requirement
informed the Seventh Circuit's understanding of what the officers
26 Id. ("We are not concerned with whether plaintiffs' asserted belief that the
officers' behavior had given them implied permission to violate traffic laws oth-
erwise banning pedestrians from the roadway would constitute a defense to the
charge of disorderly conduct; that issue would be presented to a court adjudi-
cating the criminal charges against plaintiffs."); see also id. at 96 ("The extent of
[Cox's defense] is less than clear, and we need not decide here how far it might
extend.").
27 Id. at 95-96, 95 n.12; see also Vodak v. City of Chicago, 639 F.3d 738, 746-47
(7th Cir. 2011); Buck v. City of Albuquerque, 549 F.3d 1269, 1286-87 (10th Cir.
2008); Hayes-Deats, supra note 1, at 164-69.
28 Garcia, 779 F.3d at 95 n.12.
29 For the sake of simplicity, this Article will focus on the differences between
the Second and Seventh Circuits. As noted above, the Tenth Circuit's decision is
broadly consistent with the Seventh's.
3 0See Vodak, 639 F.3d at 749-50.
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policing the march had permitted demonstrators to do.31 Effectively,
because officers had not insisted that demonstrators specify a route
to which they would adhere, the Seventh Circuit placed the burden of
ambiguity on officers, interpreting them to have permitted anything
they had not clearly proscribed by, for example, "prepar[ing] in ad-
vance reasonable measures for preventing the demonstration from
spilling over the boundaries of the authorized march."32 This ap-
proach collapsed the distinction between explicit and implicit per-
mission that the Second Circuit has since emphasized. Effectively, the
Seventh Circuit found that, because officers had explicitly permitted
the demonstrators to march, they had further permitted the demon-
strators to be in any location that the officers had not clearly told
them to avoid. Thus, the Seventh Circuit could find that demonstra-
tors' right to fair warning would be "clearly established" even in the
absence of controlling precedent because notice was required to lim-
it the scope of permission:
No precedent should be necessary . . . to establish
that the Fourth Amendment does not permit the po-
lice to say to a person go ahead and march and then,
five minutes later, having revoked the permission for
the march without notice to anyone, arrest the per-
son for having marched without police permission.33
In other words, the Seventh and Second Circuits' diverging conclu-
sions on the issue of whether demonstrators' right to fair warning
was clearly established resulted from earlier analytical choices, in-
cluding the choice of which constitutional provisions to emphasize.
Additionally, the split over whether demonstrators' right to
fair warning was clearly established was influenced by the courts'
differing understanding of how that right functioned procedurally.
Whereas the Second Circuit regarded the right to fair warning as an
affirmative defense that demonstrators could invoke in a criminal
trial, the Seventh Circuit characterized it as a limitation on officers'
conduct, i.e., an obligation officers had to analyze whether they had
31 See Hayes-Deats, upra note 1, at 189-91.
32 Vodak, 639 F.3d at 750; see also Hayes-Deats, upra note 1, at 168-69.
33 Vodak, 639 F.3d at 746-47. While the Seventh Circuit indicated that it would
have reached the same conclusion in the absence of controlling precedent, it al-
so emphasized that it believed that Cox compelled the result it reached.
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employed an appropriate "mechanism ... for conveying a command
to thousands of people."3 4 The Second Circuit's approach led it to
emphasize officers' limited abilities to predict how courts will later
decide an open legal issue.35 The Seventh Circuit, in contrast, focused
on facts that would have been obvious to officers, such as their abil-
ity to perceive that not all demonstrators had heard the bullhorn and
their ignorance of what other warnings demonstrators might have
received.36 Thus, the divergence between the Second and Seventh
Circuits over whether demonstrators' right to fair warning is clearly
established followed from their very different views about the na-
ture of the right in question.
The circuit split described above both supports and chal-
lenges the analysis from Demonstrators' Right to Fair Warning. On
the one hand, the disagreement concerning the nature and scope of
the right to fair warning supports the claims (1) that multiple consti-
tutional provisions could plausibly provide the right's foundation
and (2) that the choice between those provisions affects the right's
scope. On the other hand, the Second Circuit's conclusion that Cox es-
tablishes only a narrow "due process holding" challenges the argu-
ment that demonstrators' right to fair warning is actually a nar-
rowed form of First Amendment review that courts apply to officers'
conduct in order to avoid invalidating problematic statutory
schemes. The remainder of this Article addresses these issues.
Ill. THE IMPORTANCE OF THE ORIGIN OF DEMONSTRATORS'
RIGHT TO FAIR WARNING
Demonstrators' Right to Fair Warning argued that
"[g]rounding the right to fair warning in the Due Process Clause
would raise severe doubts about whether the right applies to de-
monstrators who have received only implicit permission."37 As artic-
ulated in Raley v. Ohio,38 a right to fair warning under the Due Pro-
cess Clause originates from a prohibition on the "indefensible sort of
34 Id. at 746.
3s Garcia v. Does, 779 F.3d 84,96 (2d Cir. 2015).
36 Vodak, 639 F.3d at 746.
37 Hayes-Deats, supra note 1, at 211.
38 Raley v. Ohio, 360 U.S. 423 (1959).
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entrapment" that occurs when a state convicts someone "for exercis-
ing a privilege which the State had clearly told him was available to
him."3 9 Because a right to fair warning grounded in the First
Amendment would protect demonstrators who receive only implicit
permission,40 Demonstrators' Right to Fair Warning concluded that
the constitutional provision that courts identify as the basis for de-
monstrators' right to fair warning has important implications for the
right's scope.4' The contrast between Garcia and Vodak strongly
supports each of these arguments.
Several aspects of the Second Circuit's opinion in Garcia indi-
cate that it regarded the Due Process Clause as the foundation of
demonstrators' right to fair warning. First and foremost, the Second
Circuit described Cox as establishing a "due process holding."4 2 Other
aspects of the Second Circuit's opinion further indicate that the court
grounded demonstrators' right to fair warning in the Due Process
Clause. As described above, Garcia regarded the right to fair warning
as a defense against criminal conviction, rather than as a limitation
on officers' conduct.43 This characterization evokes Cox's discussion
of Raley v. Ohio and "indefensible ... entrapment."44 Courts have in-
terpreted the defense recognized in Raley extremely narrowly, re-
quiring defendants to demonstrate that responsible officials "clearly
told" them their conduct was permissible.45 Garcia followed this ap-
proach, holding that the defense it perceived would defeat probable
cause only if demonstrators could show that a "police officer made
a[] gesture or spoke a[] word that unambiguously authorized protes-
tors to continue to block traffic." 46 Thus, Garcia characterized the
right to fair warning as a due process defense against entrapment,
one that existed only where permission was unambiguous.
In Vodak, the Seventh Circuit took a markedly different view
of demonstrators' right to fair warning. Rather than evaluating
3 Id. at 425-26; see also Hayes-Deats, upra note 1, at 211-12.
40 Hayes-Deats, supra note 1, at 209-11.
41 Id. at 145, 216-17.
42 Garcia v. Does, 779 F.3d 84, 95 n.12 (2d Cir. 2015).
43 Id. at 93.
44 Raley, 360 U.S. at 425-26; see also MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.04(3)(b)(iv)(2001).
45 Raley, 360 U.S. at 425-26; see generally Hayes-Deats, upra note 1, at 178-79.
46 Garcia, 779 F.3d at 94 (emphasis added).
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whether officers had explicitly permitted demonstrators' specific
conduct, the Seventh Circuit noted that the First Amendment had re-
quired officers to permit demonstrators to protest spontaneously in
response to the United States' invasion of Iraq.4 7 Because officers had
generally permitted the demonstration, as required by the First
Amendment, the Seventh Circuit focused on whether they had effec-
tively revoked permission prior to making arrests by clearly com-
municating the requirements they sought to impose and giving de-
monstrators an opportunity to comply.48 The Seventh Circuit's anal-
analysis recalls Cox's discussion of what effect to give to a dispersal
order that the Supreme Court determined had not complied with the
First Amendment.49 In Cox, as in Vodak, officers had initially granted
permission that they later sought to revoke. Each court thus had to
determine whether officers' attempts to revoke their earlier grant of
permission had complied with the Constitution. The Seventh Circuit
concluded that revocation was constitutional only where "police had
... good reason to believe [demonstrators] knew they were violating
a police order."50 Thus, focusing on the First Amendment led the
Seventh Circuit to ask not whether officers had explicitly permitted
demonstrators to march in the place where arrests had occurred-
something officers had not done "unambiguously"51-but instead
whether officers could reasonably believe that demonstrators
"knew" that their conduct was excluded from officers' earlier, more
general grant of permission.52
The discussion above demonstrates that the Second and Sev-
enth Circuits' answers to the question of whether demonstrators had
a clearly established right o fair warning largely followed from how
each court had framed that question, and in particular from the con-
stitutional provision that influenced each court's understanding of
Cox's right to fair warning. Whereas Garcia considered whether of-
ficers could reasonably anticipate a permission-based affirmative de-
47 Vodak v. City of Chicago, 639 F.3d 738, 749 (7th Cir. 2011).
48 Id. at 746-47.
49 Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 559, 572 (1965).
50 Vodak, 639 F.3d at 746.
s1 See Hayes-Deats, supra note 1, at 168-69, 189.
52Id.
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fense that demonstrators might invoke,5 Vodak asked whether offic-
ers could reasonably believe that they had revoked their earlier
permission in a constitutionally acceptable manner.54 The courts'
emphases on different constitutional provisions created these differ-
ences. Because a due process defense exists only in cases of "unam-
biguous" permission, the Second Circuit asked whether officers had
explicitly permitted the behavior for which they arrested demonstra-
tors.5 5 In contrast, according to the Seventh Circuit, the First
Amendment required officers to permit demonstrators to protest,
and the court thus held officers responsible for any ambiguity about
the scope of that compelled permission.5 6 Moreover, because cases
recognizing a due process right to fair warning typically treated that
right as a defense against conviction, the Second Circuit viewed the
right as such in Garcia.57 In contrast, by focusing on the First
Amendment, the Seventh Circuit regarded the right to fair warning
as a set of limitations on officers' ability to revoke or limit permis-
sion.58 Thus, the constitutional provisions the Second and Seventh
Circuits chose to emphasize led them to regard demonstrators' right
to fair warning very differently, effectively determining their diver-
gent answers to the question of whether the right to fair warning
was clearly established in the analogous circumstances they faced.
Demonstrators' Right to Fair Warning foresaw the possibility of such
divergence,59 and that possibility motivated the Article's efforts to
resolve the ambiguity over the origins of the right to fair warning.
IV. LOCATING THE RIGHT TO FAIR WARNING
Having analyzed the support that the newfound circuit split
provides for the arguments set forth in Demonstrators' Right to Fair
Warning, consideration now turns to the principal challenge Garcia
presents to those arguments. Demonstrators' Right to Fair Warning
s3 Garcia v. Does, 779 F.3d 84, 96 (2d Cir. 2015).
54 Vodak, 639 F.3d at 746.
ss Garcia, 779 F.3d at 95.
56 Vodak, 639 F.3d at 745.
57 See Garcia, 779 F.3d at 94.
sB See Vodak, 639 F.3d at 746.
59 See Hayes-Deats, upra note 1, at 140-41.
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contended that cases vindicating the right to fair warning, including
Cox v. Louisiana, applied a narrowed form of First Amendment re-
view, one designed to avoid striking down problematic statutes, as
the First Amendment would normally require, while still affording
demonstrators full First Amendment protection, including the ability
to protest spontaneously in response to current events.60 Garcia v.
Does, in contrast, held that Cox established only a narrow "due pro-
cess holding,"61 namely, that "demonstrators or others who have
been advised by the police that their behavior is lawful may not be
punished for that behavior."62 This reading of Cox calls the central
argument of Demonstrators' Right to Fair Warning into question. Ac-
cordingly, Part IV considers Garcia's interpretation of Cox and its im-
plications for the right to fair warning.
The perceived conflict between Garcia and Demonstrators'
Right to Fair Warning might strike some readers as imagined, rather
than real. After all, Demonstrators' Right to Fair Warning argued that
ambiguity surrounded both the constitutional origin of demonstra-
tors' right to fair warning and, consequently, its scope.63 Such an ar-
gument appears consistent with Garcia's conclusion that the right to
fair warning did not unambiguously prohibit arrests in the circum-
stances presented.64 Nonetheless, that apparent consistency is mis-
leading. To overcome a defense of qualified immunity, a plaintiff
must show that existing precedent clearly establishes that an arrest
is unconstitutional, not why an arrest is unconstitutional. The consti-
tutional basis for a right, then, is irrelevant to a qualified immunity
defense if existing precedent recognizes the right with sufficient
specificity. As described below, and as the Seventh Circuit has held,
Cox clearly established that, where officers had permitted a demon-
stration, they had an obligation to revoke permission in a manner
that complied with the Constitution.6s
60 See Hayes-Deats, upra note 1, at 202-14.
61 Garcia, 779 F.3d at 95 n.12.
62 Id. at 96.
63 See Hayes-Deats, upra note 1, at 144-47.
64 Garcia, 779 F.3d at 96.
65 In fact, existing Second Circuit precedent had discussed the limitations the
First Amendment placed on officers policing a demonstration. See Papineau v.
Parmley, 465 F.3d 46, 60 (2d Cir. 2006). Specifically, Papineau held that the
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The most striking aspect of Garcia's interpretation of Cox is
what it ignores. In Cox, while officers initially "advised" demonstra-
tors that "their behavior [was] lawful," they subsequently changed
course, ordering the demonstrators to disperse.66 Far from relying
on officers' permission, then, "appellant Cox defied the [dispersal]
order by telling the crowd not to move."67 Thus, as the dissent em-
phasized, a right based solely on explicit permission would not have
protected demonstrators, who continued their demonstration even
after the explicit revocation of permission.68 The majority in Cox
dealt with the dispersal order not on due process grounds, but in-
stead by holding that, under the First Amendment, the officers had
not provided a "valid reason" for revoking the permission they had
extended.69 By ignoring the dispersal order, and the Cox majority's
treatment of it, Garcia overlooked the importance of the First
Amendment to Cox's holding and to the right to fair warning it estab-
lished. Cox established not only a due process right not to be arrest-
ed for conduct that officers had permitted, but also a right to have
permission revoked in a way that did not violate the First Amend-
ment.70
Taking the dispersal order into account, Cox becomes much
more difficult to distinguish from Garcia. In Garcia, the officers did
not dispute that, by their conduct, they had permitted demonstrators
to march without a parade permit and to violate traffic laws that
First Amendment required even officers who had "a lawful basis to interfere
with [a] demonstration" to first provide a warning that would "'enable the ordi-
nary citizen to conform his or her conduct to the law."' Id. (quoting Feiner v.
New York, 340 U.S. 315, 321 (1950)). Garcia distinguished Papineau on the
ground that demonstrators did not "need[] permission from the police to en-
gage in that protest." Garcia, 779 F.3d at 94 n.11. If, however, the Second Circuit
had asked whether officers in Garcia had satisfactorily revoked or limited their
prior permission to demonstrate, that distinction would have become inappo-
site.
66 Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 559, 572 (1965).
67 Id. at 582 (Black, J., dissenting).
68 Id. at 583; see also id. at 587 (Clark, I., dissenting) ("The only way the court
can support its finding is to ignore the time limitation and hold-as it does sub
silentio-that once Cox and the 2,000 demonstrators were permitted to occupy
the sidewalk they could remain indefinitely.").
69 Id. at 572-73 (majority opinion).
70 Id. at 574.
2015]1 REVISITING FAIR WARNING 193
would have otherwise applied.7' By analyzing only whether officers
had explicitly permitted demonstrators to take the further step of
proceeding onto the Brooklyn Bridge's vehicular roadway, the Se-
cond Circuit avoided the question of whether officers had revoked or
limited their existing permission in a manner that complied with the
First Amendment, one of the principal points of disagreement be-
tween the majority and the dissent in Cox. Thus, Garcia unduly lim-
ited the scope of the right Cox had established. Because the demon-
strators in Garcia had officers' undisputed permission to march,
either implicitly or explicitly, Cox established not only a due-process
right that demonstrators would have had if officers had explicitly
permitted them to continue their march on the Brooklyn Bridge's
vehicular roadway, but also a right to have officers revoke or limit
the permission they had already granted in a manner that complied
with the First Amendment.
Only two bases exist for distinguishing the Brooklyn Bridge's
vehicular roadway from the other locations where officers had per-
mitted demonstrators to march, and thus from the apparent scope of
officers' existing permission: (1) the warning officers provided
through a bull horn; and (2) the intrusion of demonstrators into a
new, categorically different area. But these bases were the precise
distinctions that the Seventh and Tenth Circuits had rejected. Specif-
ically, the Seventh Circuit had concluded that a bullhorn was "no
mechanism for conveying a command to thousands of people."72
Similarly, the Tenth Circuit held that officers had "sanctioned [a]
march" that spilled over into new areas "by closing off streets to traf-
fic, [and] also by directing the progress and direction of the proces-
71 Garcia v. Does, 779 F.3d 84, 88, 90 n.7 (2d Cir. 2015). Specifically, while the
officers argued before the district court that they had probable cause broadly to
arrest demonstrators for parading without a permit in violation of New York
City Administrative Code § 10-110(a), they abandoned that argument on ap-
peal. Id. In doing so, the officers effectively acknowledged that, regardless of
whether they had explicitly informed demonstrators that they would not re-
quire a permit, they did not have probable cause to arrest each and every de-
monstrator, whether or not that demonstrator had proceeded onto to the
Brooklyn Bridge's vehicular roadway.
72 See Vodak v. City of Chicago, 639 F.3d 738, 746 (7th Cir. 2011).
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sion."73 Thus, the two bases for distinguishing Garcia from Cox are
bases that other courts had already rejected.
Other First Amendment doctrines, in addition to Cox, indicate
that once officers have permitted a spontaneous demonstration, the
First Amendment significantly constrains their ability to revoke or
limit that permission. Nearly every circuit to have addressed the is-
sue has held that the First Amendment requires statutory and regu-
latory schemes to permit spontaneous demonstrations in response
to developing events.7 4 But a right to demonstrate spontaneously
would mean little if demonstrators could exercise it only where of-
ficers had "beckon[ed] to [them] or state[d] by word or gesture that
they were welcome to proceed."75 Prior cases, including Garcia, indi-
cate that, rather than extending explicit permission, officers fre-
quently permit spontaneous demonstrations simply by tolerating
them.76 If officers who have implicitly permitted a march have prob-
able cause to arrest demonstrators for any violation of the traffic
laws that they have not explicitly permitted, then many actions that
commonly occur in protests will subject demonstrators to potential
arrest.7 7 Indeed, First Amendment jurisprudence has long recog-
73 Buck v. City of Albuquerque, 549 F.3d 1269, 1283 (10th Cir. 2008). Compare
Garcia, 779 F.3d at 89 (noting that plaintiffs "allege that the combination of. . .
officers in front 'leading' the protesters onto the roadway and the officers on
the side escorting them along the roadway led them to believe that the NYPD
was escorting and permitting the march to proceed onto the roadway, as it had
escorted and permitted the march through lower Manhattan earlier in the
day").
74 See Hayes-Deats, supra note 1, at 192-93 (citing decisions from the First,
Sixth, Seventh, Eighth, Ninth, and D.C. Circuits).
7s Garcia, 779 F.3d at 90.
76 Id. at 88 ("Although no permit for the march had been sought, the [NYPD]
was aware of the planned event in advance, and NYPD officers escorted the
marchers...."); Vodak, 639 F.3d at 741 ("This waiver of the permit requirement
is informal; it seems to consist just in not telling the demonstrators that they
need a permit."); Buck, 549 F.3d at 1283 ("[O]fficers' conduct essentially
amounted to the grant of a defacto parade permit....").
77 For example, marching alongside a silent officer could subject a demonstra-
tor to arrest if it later turned out that the officer did not intend to permit the
demonstrator to enter that particular roadway. Garcia, 779 F.3d at 89. Further
examples are easily generated. In New York, demonstrators could make "unrea-
sonable noise" in violation of N.Y. PENAL LAw § 240.20(2), "obstruct[ vehicular
or pedestrian traffic" in violation of N.Y. PENAL LAw § 240.20(5), be "masked or
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nized a tension between the First Amendment and laws that protect
the public order, noting that demonstrating "best serve[s] its high
purpose when it induces a condition of unrest, creates dissatisfaction
with conditions as they are, or even stirs people to anger."78
Permitting arrests for actions that routinely occur during a
demonstration would create a legal paradox: demonstrators would
have a right to spontaneously protest, but would face potential ar-
rest for many of the actions that protesting entails.79 This paradox
would erode the right to spontaneously demonstrate. First, as sug-
gested above, demonstrators would not, in many instances, have a
right to engage in the specific actions necessary to effectuate their
broader right to demonstrate. Second, the uncertainty over the ex-
tent of demonstrators' right to spontaneously demonstrate would
chill the exercise of that right, since the demonstrators could fore-
close the possibility of arrest only by not demonstrating.80 As a prac-
tical matter, the existence of a potential "defense to the charge" on
which officers arrested demonstrators would provide demonstrators
little reassurance.8' In many cases, prosecutors simply drop charges
against arrested demonstrators, obviating the need to present any
defense.82 Moreover, even where charges are dropped, arrests can
have significant collateral consequences, inhibiting the arrestees' ac-
in any manner disguised by unusual or unnatural attire or facial alteration" in
violation of N.Y. PENAL LAW § 240.35(4), or "remain[] in or about school
grounds" in violation of N.Y. PENAL LAW § 240.35(5).
78 Terminiello v. City of Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 4 (1949).
79 See, e.g., N.Y. PENAL LAW § 240.20(2)(Consol. 2015)(criminalizing "unreasona-
ble noise").
80 See Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 612 (1973) (noting that the exist-
ence of a prohibition may cause individuals "to refrain from constitutionally
protected speech or expression").
81 Garcia, 779 F.3d at 93.
82 See, e.g., Colin Moynihan, Charges Are Dropped for 14 Demonstrators, N.Y.
TIMEs, Feb. 17, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/18/nyregion/
charges-are-dropped-for- 14-occupy-wall-street-protesters.html?_r=0. The pos-
sibility of dropping charges in order to avoid review of conduct's constitutional-
ity might itself create First Amendment problems, as it generates opportunities
for discriminatory enforcement and deters conduct that the First Amendment
protects. See Hayes-Deats, upra note 1, at 2 17-18.
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cess to employment, credit, and housing.83 Thus, failing to protect
demonstrators from arrests for conduct they understood to be part
of demonstrating-or at least did not reasonably understand to have
been prohibited-would undercut the well-recognized right to spon-
taneously demonstrate.
A right to fair warning grounded in the First Amendment
avoids the paradox described above by applying the same First
Amendment principles to statutory regimes and officers' abilities to
revoke permissions and make arrests. As argued in Demonstrators'
Right to Fair Warning, past cases have effectively deployed the right
to fair warning as a narrowed form of First Amendment review that
avoids invalidating troublesome statutory schemes by focusing on
whether officers' conduct complies with applicable First Amendment
principles.84 This approach results from a simple logic, even if courts
have not explained that logic clearly. If courts wish to forgo subject-
ing public order statutes to a searching First Amendment analysis-
either because they do not believe the statutes can be more narrowly
tailored or because, in a given instance, officers have waived the
problematic prohibition-they cannot do so at the expense of de-
monstrators' First Amendment rights.85 Simply put, courts have rec-
ognized that, because demonstrators have a First Amendment right
to spontaneously protest, hey must also have a First Amendment
right not to be arrested in a manner that would erode their broader
right or deter its exercise.86
IV. CONCLUSION
As described above, the Second Circuit's decision in Garcia
has generated a circuit split that squarely presents the question of
83 See Gary Fields & John R. Emshwiller, As Arrest Records Rise, Americans Find
Consequences Can Last a Lifetime, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 18, 2014)
http://www.wsj.com/articles/as-arrest-records-rise-americans-find-
consequences-can-last-a-lifetime-1408415402 ("Many people who have never
faced charges, or have had charges dropped, find that a lingering arrest record
can ruin their chance to secure employment, loans and housing.").




what constitutional provision creates demonstrators' right to fair
warning and how far that right extends. Only the Supreme Court can
conclusively resolve this question. Although the emergence of a cir-
cuit split supports some of the analysis advanced in Demonstrators'
Right to Fair Warning, it impugns that Article's central argument.
This short response has contended that Garcia's interpretation of
demonstrators' right to fair warning is unpersuasive.
Perhaps surprisingly, the Second Circuit's divergence from
the past cases that have considered demonstrators' right to fair
warning appears influenced not by its reading of those past cases,
discussions of which are largely confined to footnotes,87 as much as
by its interpretation of the Supreme Court's recent qualified immuni-
ty jurisprudence. In reaching its holding, the Second Circuit cited
four qualified immunity decisions that the Supreme Court has issued
since 2011.88 To the extent that the Second Circuit understood those
cases to indicate that courts should give the narrowest possible in-
terpretation to the constitutional rights plaintiffs invoke, upholding
qualified immunity defenses wherever defendants have a colorable
argument that existing precedent has not clearly established the
constitutional right at issue,9 the Circuit's reasoning and outcome
raise a troubling possibility. As described above, the Second Circuit's
conclusion that the right was not "clearly established" followed from
its characterization of the right itself. In the future, that characteriza-
tion will influence not only cases that consider qualified immunity
defenses, but also any other case involving demonstrators' right to
fair warning, including cases where demonstrators raise the right to
fair warning as a defense to a criminal charge. To the extent cases
that do not involve qualified immunity adopt the Second Circuit's
narrowed view of demonstrators' right to fair warning, the Supreme
Court's qualified immunity jurisprudence will have altered the ap-
parent trajectory of that right's development. This phenomenon
could potentially occur more generally, raising the question of
87 See Garcia, 779 F.3d at 94-95 nn.11-12.
88 Id. at 95-97 & n.12 (citing Wood v. Moss, 134 S. Ct. 2056 (2014); Reichle v.
Howards, 132 S. Ct. 2088 (2012); Messerschmidt v. Millender, 132 S. Ct. 1235
(2012); Ashcroftv. al-Kidd, 131 S. Ct. 2074 (2011)).
89 Garcia, 779 F.3d at 95 n.12 (requiring that "the question at issue" be "beyond
debate" (quoting al-Kidd, 131 S. Ct. at 2083)).
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whether the narrow interpretations courts give when considering
whether constitutional rights are "clearly established" emanate be-
yond the qualified immunity jurisprudence, narrowing or even erod-
ing constitutional rights in other contexts.90
90 Cf Stephen R. Reinhardt, The Demise of Habeas Corpus and the Rise of Quali-
fied Immunity, 113 MIcH. L. REV. 1219, 1248-49 (2015) (arguing that "qualified
immunity" jurisprudence has become "a mechanism to stunt the development
of constitutional rights").
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